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Abstract  
Norm violations can be contagious. Previous research analyzed two mechanisms of why 
knowledge  about  others‟  norm  violations  triggers  its  spread:  (1)  Actors  lower  their 
subjective beliefs about the probability or severity of punishment, or (2) they condition 
their  compliance  on  others‟  compliance.  While  earlier  field  studies  could  hardly 
disentangle  both  effects,  we  use  a  laboratory  experiment  which  eliminated  any 
punishment threat. Subjects (n = 466) could commit a violation of the honesty norm. 
They threw a die and were paid according to their reported number. Our design ruled out 
any possibility of personal identification so that subjects could lie about their thrown 
number and claim inflated payoffs without risking detection. The aggregate distribution 
of  reported  payoffs  allowed  determining  the  extent  of  liars  in  the  population.  Two 
treatments  in  which  subjects  were  informed  about  lying  behavior  of  others  were 
compared  to  a  control  condition  without  information  feedback.  Distributions  from  a 
subsequent dice throw revealed that knowledge about liars triggered the spread of lying 
compared to the control condition. Our results demonstrate the contagiousness of norm 
violations, where actors imitate norm violations of others under the exclusion of strategic 
motives.  
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Ignorance can act as a protective barrier to the spread of norm violations. This hypothesis has 
its German roots in the writings of  Heinrich Popitz (1968). In the American sociological 
tradition, a similar notion has been raised by the so-called broken windows theory. Both 
traditions emphasize the contagiousness of norm violations. The paradigmatic example is the 2 
 
observation  of  broken  windows  in  a  neighborhood  or  other  signs  of  disorder,  which 
eventually trigger the spread of norm violations (Wilson 1982).  
There is a growing body of empirical research testing the hypothesis, an example of which is 
the series of field experiments by Keizer et al. (2008). These experiments tested whether 
information about a certain kind of disorder triggered the spread of other kinds of disorder. 
The authors could show that signs of graffiti caused people to litter, public occurrences of 
illegal parking caused illegal trespassing, a large extent of unreturned shopping carts at a 
supermarket caused littering and signs of graffiti and litter caused people to steal money from 
sealed envelopes hanging out of mailboxes. In another set of field experiments, Cialdini et al. 
(1990) showed that people have a higher propensity to litter into the environment if they 
observe others littering and if the environment is already littered.  
While the empirical evidence for the contagiousness of norm violations is fairly robust, the 
causal mechanisms driving this effect are unclear. Two main factors can be identified, which 
are rooted in two different schools of thought. First, the effect could be explained by rational-
choice theory. Observing others‟ norm violations may cause people to update their beliefs 
regarding their cost-benefit analysis of norm violations (Becker 1968, Allingham and Sandmo 
1972,  Bikhchandani,  Hirshleifer  and  Welch  1998,  Groeber  and  Rauhut  2010).  Signs  of 
disorder could therefore show that norm violations are hardly detected and, if so, only mildly 
punished.  
Second, the effect could be explained by the social psychological focus theory (Cialdini et al. 
1990; see also Gino et al. 2009). Observations of others‟ norm violations may change actors‟ 
beliefs about the appropriateness of their own actions. In this sense, descriptive norms, i.e. 
what most people do, affect injunctive norms, i.e. what most people approve of. To put it in 
simple words: if others break a certain norm, it is fine if you break it too. We call this effect 
conditional norm compliance. More precisely, we mean with conditional norm compliance 
the motivation of individuals to adhere to norms if they believe that others do so as well and 
to violate them if they believe that others violate them.
1 
                                                            
1 The concept of conditional norm compliance relates to the recent debate about conditional cooperation in 
experimental economics (Fischbacher et al. 2001; Gächter 2007). However, the concept is more general in so far 
as it refers to pure imitation without requiring strategic motives of reciprocity. 3 
 
This paper seeks to disentangle both mechanisms by ruling out one of them by design. Our 
objective is to demonstrate that conditional norm compliance is sufficient to trigger the effects 
of  ignorance  on  norm  compliance.  While  other  studies,  like  the  recent  one  by  Keizer, 
Lindenberg  and  Steg  (2008)  or  the  ones  in  the  broken  windows  tradition  (Sampson  and 
Raudenbush 2004; Wilson and Kelling 1982) had to come up with additional assumptions that 
punishment of observed norm violations is simply uncommon and therefore negiglible, we 
can  rule  out  the  punishment  argument  not  only  by  arm-chair  speculation  but  by  our 
experimental  design.  In  what  follows,  we  discuss  examples,  case  studies  and  previous 
research  regarding  the  contagiousness  of  norm  violations.  Then  we  introduce  our 
experimental design, analyze our empirical results and discuss our findings.  
 
II.  CONTAGIOUSNESS OF NORM VIOLATIONS 
Imagine you knew that most inhabitants of your city evaded taxes, cheated on their partners, 
dodged paying the fares for public transport, lied about their age at dates and crossed against 
red  lights.  While  we  may  intuitively  think  that  a  high  detection  rate  of  norm  violations 
maintained  social  order,  this  very  knowledge  of  others‟  norm  violations  may  lower  the 
willingness to comply with norms. Loosely based on the aphorism “what the eye does not see, 
the heart does not grieve over”, ignorance of norm violations can have a preventive effect. In 
what follows, we use the term ignorance hypothesis to refer to the preventive effect of not 
knowing about others norm violations. 
We know the contagious effects of norm violations from scenarios in which norm violations 
are visible. If many people start to cross against the red light at a crosswalk, others join in. If 
many cars in a street park in clearways, the sideway and other no-parking zones quickly 
become jammed of cars. Seeing a littered beach makes people more likely to litter themselves, 
which gradually pollutes the beach. However, many norm violations are not directly visible 
but conducted in private. Two-timing, tax evasion, consumption of pornography, visits of 
prostitutes or alcohol abuse are behaviors which are often concealed from others. Some of 
which are revealed, but others remain covered.  
Seneca was probably one of the first making the observation that ignorance  can act as a 
protective barrier to the spread of norm violations. About two thousand years ago, he wrote in 
his Moral Essays:  4 
 
“In that state in which men are rarely punished a sympathy for uprightness is formed, and 
encouragement  is  given  to  this  virtue  as  to  a  common  good.  Let  a  state  think  itself 
blameless, and it will be so; its anger against those who depart from the general sobriety 
will be greater if it sees that they are few. Believe me, it is dangerous to show a state in 
how great a majority evil men are.” (Seneca 1928 [first 63], xxii. 3-xxiv. 1)
2 
Nearly 2000 years later, the German sociologist Popitz (1968) suggested a more detailed 
account specifying the ignorance hypotheses by three impossibility statements:  
“Impossible is the complete transparency of all norm-relevant behaviors in society, a 
normative  system  which  could  cope  with  the  detection  of  all  norm  violations,  and  a 
punishment system which would retain its protective function if all norm violations were 
sanctioned” (Popitz 1968, 18, translated by the authors).  
Popitz (1968) illustrates the ignorance hypotheses by a thought experiment from Thackeray‟s 
(1869) classical novel. Consider what would happen if every norm violation was actually 
detected:  
“Just  picture  to  yourself  everybody  who  does  wrong  being  found  out,  and  punished 
accordingly. Fancy all the boys in all the schools being whipped; and then the assistants, 
and then the headmaster  (…) Fancy the provost marshal being tied up, having previously 
superintended the correction of the whole army. (…) The butchery is too horrible. The 
hand drops powerless, appalled at the quantity of birch which it must cut and brandish. I 
am glad we are not all found out” (Thackeray, 1869, as quoted in Popitz 1968). 
The impossibility of complete transparency of normative behavior builds the foundation for 
two macro-sociological hypotheses: 1. If the complete extent of norm violations was known, 
norm violations would gradually increase and the normative system would collapse. 2. If all 
norm violations were sanctioned, the punishment system would collapse. The counterintuitive 
                                                            
2 These observations built the basis of Seneca‟s political recommendation to uphold ignorance of the number of 
slaves: “A proposal was once made in the senate to distinguish slaves from free men by their dress; it then 
became apparent how great would be the impending danger if our slaves should begin to count our number. Be 
sure that we have a like danger to fear if no man's guilt is pardoned; it will soon become apparent how greatly 
the worse element of the state preponderates.” (Seneca 1928 [first 63], xxii. 3-xxiv. 1) More recently, in The 
New York Times, Friedman (2011) pointed out that, among other things, the information about the unequal 
distribution  of  land  accessible  through  Google  Earth  lead  to  popular  uprising  against  the  ruling  family  in 
Bahrain. Note however  that the question  of how  perceived inequality  may  deteriorate the legitimacy of an 
autocratic system is a related but different question than the one implied in our ignorance hypothesis. Here we 
suggest  that  ignorance  about  norm  violations  prevents  the  diffusion  of  such  behavior  and  thus  stabilizes  a 
normative system. 5 
 
point here is that the political goal to uncover undetected norm violations actually counteracts 
the stability of the norm.  
It is possible to reconstruct the macro-sociological correlation of the ignorance hypothesis by 
micro-level mechanisms. Its main premise is that actors do not exactly know if and to what 
extent other members of society violate a particular norm  – be it black labor, corruption, 
smuggling, shoplifting, “deviant” sexual practices or adultery: “There is in general a large 
discrepancy between the actual and the subjectively perceived extent of norm violations.” 
(Popitz 1968: 15) Ignorance typically implies underestimation of the extent of norm violations 
in the population, which lowers actors‟ propensity for norm violations. “Many social forces 
work towards generating a relatively favorable representation of norm compliance in society, 
which may also be described as the general requirement for the „functioning‟ of a particular 
social  norm  in  society”  (Popitz  1968:15).  This  implies  that  if  the  actual  extent  of  norm 
violations was known, the legitimacy of the norm would deteriorate.  
The aforementioned theoretical reasoning may be illustrated by an example from the history 
of the German Democratic Republic (GDR). The socialist state discouraged to watch Western 
television  channels  and  political  campaigns  against  households  lacking  this  kind  of 
compliance were launched. The crux was that households consuming Western television were 
identifiable by the direction of their antennas upon their roofs. Walter Ulbricht, the leader of 
the East Germany Communist Party at that time realized that this lifted the veil of ignorance 
and stated “the class enemy is sitting on the roof” (Spiegel 1980, p. 42). He tried to revert the 
situation by encouraging the East German youth organization “Freie Deutsche Jugend” to tear 
down television antennas oriented to receive Western German channels (Marks 1983, p. 50). 
Too late – the otherwise unknown extent of Western television consumption was already 
revealed  to  everybody.  In  fact,  this  knowledge  eventually  triggered  the  collapse  of  the 
prohibitive norm against Western television consumption in 1973 (Spiegel 1980, p. 44). 
Furthermore, lifting the veil of ignorance may even trigger normative change as the Kinsey 
report (1948; 1953) about sexual behaviors in the United States exemplified:  
“In sum, Kinsey was the major factor in changing attitudes about sex in the twentieth 
century. (...) He changed the nature of sexual studies, forced a reexamination of public 
attitudes toward sex, challenged the medical and psychiatric establishment to reassess its 
own views, influenced both the feminist movement and the gay and lesbian movement, 6 
 
and built a library and an institution devoted to sex research. His reputation continues to 
grow, and he has become one of the legends of the twentieth century.“ (Bullough 1998, p. 
131)  
With respect to our argument, the veil of ignorance of various sexual practices was lifted. The 
extent of homosexual behavior, masturbation, oral sex and other practices became public. It 
became apparent that these behaviors were more widespread than previously thought, which 
triggered their subsequent spread and eventually contributed to a fundamental change in norms 
and  values  in  people‟s  sex  lives.  We  test  the  ignorance  hypothesis  in  a  simple  laboratory 
experiment, the design of which will be explained next. 
 
III.  DESIGN OF THE EXPERIMENT 
The question as to whether ignorance has a preventive effect is an empirical question. One 
problem with traditional research designs such as surveys or official crime records, however, 
is that the actual extent of norm violations is not only unknown to the population but also to 
the researcher. Generally, there is undercoverage of norm violations so that the actual rate has 
to  be  estimated  by  making  a  number  of  influential  assumptions  which  are  often  hard  to 
validate. In contrast, laboratory experiments enable to measure the complete rate of norm 
violations in a very direct way.  
In  laboratory  experiments,  however,  it  may  be  that  the  true  rate  of  norm  compliance  is 
overestimated because subjects feel observed and may react overly norm adherent. These 
considerations led us to the implementation of a laboratory experiment which eliminated the 
possibility  to  identify  which  particular  subject  committed  a  norm  violation.  Our  desired 
implementation  would  guarantee  perfect  anonymity  on  the  individual  level  and  allow  to 
correctly inferring the extent of norm violations from aggregated data.  
We chose the dice experiment of Fischbacher and Heusi (2008) as basic design of our study. 
Later on, we realized that the complete absence of a sanctioning threat was a desirable side 
effect of the design. The experiment enabled subjects to commit a violation of the honesty 
norm. Subjects threw a die in a completely anonymous setting, meaning that they were alone 
and not observed at all. Then, they had to report their number in complete privacy by entering 
it in a computer system located in an isolated box. Subjects received cash in Swiss Francs 
according  to  the  number  they  reported.  The  only  exception  was  the  number  six,  which 7 
 
corresponded with zero earnings. All subjects knew that they were the only ones knowing the 
true  number  they  actually  threw.  Therefore,  subjects  could  distort  the  truth  and  report  a 
number which yielded them higher monetary earnings. This meant that all subjects who did 
not  throw  a  “five”  faced  an  internal  conflict  between  maximizing  their  own  payoff  by 
reporting  a  higher  number  and  adhering  to  the  honesty  norm.  The  implementation  of 
anonymity among subjects and between subjects and experimenter eliminated any possibility 
to detect liars. This guaranteed that our experimental design avoided any confounding with 
punishment threats, neither material nor social ones. In addition, our experiment avoided any 
confounding with strategic reasoning. Individual lying did not affect the payoffs of other 
subjects.  
Of course, our experiment did not allow for the observation of individual norm violations. It 
was actually the point of the whole procedure to guarantee individuals‟ complete anonymity 
for a valid elicitation of behaviors. Nonetheless, we can estimate the extent of norm violations 
at the group level. If the honesty norm was consistently followed by all subjects, we would 
observe a rate of about one sixth for every reported number. Therefore, the extent of norm 
violations can be measured by computing the difference between theoretical and observed 
rates for each number.
3 
According to the ignorance hypothesis, knowledge  about norm violations in the population 
should trigger subsequently more norm violations. Therefore, we informed subjects about the 
distribution of reported numbers after the first throw. Thus, we uncovered the dark field of 
norm violations. We implemented two ways of communicating the empirical distributions  of 
first throws. In the information condition one (info 1), we presented the distribution of the 
dice experiment of Fischbacher and Heusi  (2008). Thus, we explained the subjects that the 
distribution they saw was an empirical distribution from 389 subjects  who came from the 
same universities and previously participated in the same experiment (the distribution and the 
respective experimental instructions can be seen in Figures A4 and A5 in the appendix). The 
distribution has a clear pattern. The over-reporting of the numbers “four” and “five” and the 
implied violation of the honesty norm is apparent. In the information condition two (info 2), 
we reported the distribution of the group which was currently playing the game (see Figure 
A6).  
                                                            
3 In this sense, the method is comparable to the so-called randomized response method (Warner 1965). 8 
 
The advantage of the first information condition is that the distribution represents behaviors of 
over three hundred subjects. Further, it does not vary over different experimental sessions. 
The disadvantage is that subjects may consider the distribution as “external”, because it stems 
from  a  group  of  different  subjects.  This  is  different  for  the  “internal”  implementation  of 
information  condition  two,  which  represented  the  behaviors  of  the  very  subjects  who 
participated  in  the  same  experimental  session.  Here,  however,  the  dice  throws  naturally 
generated a great deal of randomness. This means that the generated group distribution in 
each session was always a different distribution generated from a different group of subjects. 
Because  both  methods  are  complementary  in  their  advantages  and  disadvantages,  they 
balance each other and enable robustness checks of our empirical results.  
Further, we implemented a control treatment in which we did not present the distribution of 
first  throws.  After  the  first  throws  and  the  presentation  of  the  respective  distribution 
(respectively  its  absence  in  the  control  group),  we  implemented  another  round  in  which 
subjects were asked to throw the die again. We paid subjects for both throws similarly. Hence, 
the maximum payment was ten Swiss Francs. Table 1 summarizes our design.  
Table 1: The experimental design 
control group (info 0)  O     O 
experimental group 1 (info 1)  O  X1  O 
experimental group 2 (info 2)  O  X2  O 
O denotes observation, X intervention. 
 
The instructions made it clear that subjects were allowed to test their die. Thus, they were 
allowed  to throw the  die  as  many times  as  they wished.  However, only  the first  throw 
counted. This rule was stated very explicitly. This setup made it possible for subjects to 
ensure that they were not deceived by fraud dice. Furthermore, this setup implicitly provided 
self-justifications for lying and therefore  made it easier for subjects to violate the honesty 
norm in favor of their self-interest. Subjects who were unlucky with their first throw might 
continue to throw the die and be tempted to report another, more favorable number  which 
occurred later on. Potentially, the inhibition threshold for illegitimately reporting an actual 9 
 
number of their series may be lower compared to directly entering a fraudulent number (see 
Shalvi et al. 2011 for an empirical confirmation of this argument). 
Furthermore, subjects were asked to enter their earnings in addition to their thrown numbers. 
This allowed testing as to whether they understood the rules of the game. The devaluation of 
the number six was on purpose. This potentially increased the propensity for norm violations. 
In most board games, the number “six” is a desirable outcome. Therefore, subjects may feel 
particularly frustrated if they threw a “six”, which is normally the best outcome.  
The  dice  experiment  was  conducted  at  the  end  of  four  unrelated  other  experiments.  The 
subjects were recruited from ETH Zurich and University of Zurich during May 2009 and May 
2010. The experiments were conducted using the software z-Tree (Fischbacher 2007). Thirty 
sessions  were  conducted,  each  of  which  with  fourteen  to  sixteen  subjects.  In  total,  466 
subjects participated in the experiment. There were 63 % male subjects with an average age of 
23 years (sd = 3.2). After the experiment, a small questionnaire was administered eliciting 
socio-demographic information such as income, education of the parents, religious affiliation 
and religiousness.  
 
IV.  Results 
Is the honesty norm violated at all? The Null hypothesis states that each number is rolled with 
a probability of 1/6 (i.e. 16.7 %). Even in the first throw, there is an apparent discrepancy 
between what we see and what we would observe if everybody was honest (see Figure 1). The 
relative frequency of the highest payoff is 35 % in the first and 40 % in the second throw 
(averaged over all treatments). An „honest six‟ (with zero earnings) is only reported by seven 
percent  in  the  first  and  by  six  percent  in  the  second  throw.  The  expected  probability  of 
throwing twice a five is 1/36 (2.8 %). Despite of this, 20 % report this occurrence, which is 
over seven times as much as what we would observe in an honest population (Figure 2). 
However, subjects are more cautious with reporting double sixes, which happens in only one 
percent of the cases.  10 
 
 
Figure 1: Distribution of reported numbers in the first and second throw (averaged over all 
treatments) 
Interestingly, there is even fraud below the maximum. Apparently, people make compromises 
between their compliance with the honesty norm and their self-interest. Figure 2 shows the 
distribution of the sum of both throws. The number nine occurs in 16 % of the cases although 
its expectation value would be 5.6 %. Possibly, a combination of four and five is frequently 
reported, because it seems less suspicious than a double five.  
 
 
Figure  2:  Distribution  of  reported  cumulated  payoffs  for  both  throws  (averaged  over  all 
treatments) 11 
 
While the previous analyses demonstrate that a substantial fraction of the population violates 
the honesty norm and claim more money than they are entitled to, the question remains as to 
whether lying behavior is  even  more wide-spread  if people are  informed  about the lying 
behavior  of  others.  Hence,  we  compare  the  extent  of  norm  violations  across  the  three 
experimental treatments. Figure 3 shows the differences between first and second reported 
throws in the control condition (info 0), in the condition with information about the external 
large group (info 1) and in the condition with the information about the internal small group 
(info 2). A comparison between both information conditions and the control condition yields 
significant differences (ANOVA, F2,29 = 4.90; p = 0.015; see model 1 in the appendix for 
further  details).  Note  that  there  is  no  significant  difference  between  the  experimental 
conditions  (info  1  vs.  info  2),  suggesting  that  the  kind  of  information  feedback  is  less 
important  than  the  fact  of  information  feedback.  In  contrast  to  a  comparison  of  the 
experimental  conditions with  the  control condition, it is  also possible to  test  whether the 
differences between the mean reported payoffs in the first and second throw are different from 
zero in all three treatment conditions. This is tested by a linear regression model without 
intercept (see model 2 in the Appendix). A joint test yields that the treatment differences are 
significantly different from zero (ANOVA: F3,29 = 3,47; p = 0.029). However, each separate 
treatment effect is not significantly different from zero. The p-values for the difference of the 
control condition is p = 0.10, for treatment condition 1 p = 0.07 and for treatment condition 2 
p = 0.14. However, the effects of both treatment conditions are in line with the hypothesis and 
support the conclusions from the linear regression model without intercept, which yielded 
significant differences between both experimental conditions and the control.  
Figure 4 shows that the rate of subjects who claim the highest payoff in the first and the 
second throw of the control condition is almost similar. However, this rate increases in both 
experimental conditions. Hence, the rate of norm violations increases if people are informed 
about the extent  of norm violations  in  their  own group  or  in  an  external  group. We  can 
confirm the statistical significance of this finding by logistic regression models, using the 
probability of a reported five as the outcome variable and the experimental condition as the 
predictor.  (Note  that  confidence  intervals  in  figure  4  are  computed  from  this  logistic 
regression.)  We  further substantiate our  results  by linear regression models,  in  which  we 
compute  the  difference  between  first  and  second  throws  by  experimental  condition.  This 12 
 
confirms  that  the  average  reported  numbers  are  higher  in  both  experimental  treatments 
compared to the control treatment (see Table A1 in the appendix).  
 
Figure 3: Difference between first and second reported throws by experimental condition 
 
 
Figure 4: Fraction of reported maximum payoff (throwing a “five”) by experimental condition 13 
 
 
Our  second  treatment  condition  (info  2)  offers  a  more  specific  test  of  the  ignorance 
hypothesis.  In  this  condition,  subjects  have  seen  different  rates  of  reported  first  payoffs, 
because information feedback was based on the specific sessions subjects were participating 
in.
4  Sessions varied substantially regarding the distribution of reported  first payoffs. This 
variation  may  have  partly been  due to different propensities for lying and partly to pure 
randomness in throws. We can exploit session variability in lying as indicator for the extent of 
revealed lying. In some sessions, an almost even distribution indicated a small extent of lying, 
while in others, a strongly skewed distribution indicated a large extent  of lying (see Figure 5 
for the two most extreme sessions).  
 
 
Figure 5: Illustration of the two sessions with the smallest and largest session average of 
reported first payoffs.  
Our more specific ignorance hypothesis states that a  larger extent of  revealed lying in first 
throws triggers  more subsequent lying in second throws.  We used  the  session mean  as 
indicator  of  revealed  lying.  We  regressed  session  means  of  reported  first  payoffs  on 
individuals‟ propensity to report a five in the second throw (Table 2, model 1) and on the 
                                                            
4 The session data is structured as follows. The experimental sessions consisted of fourteen to sixteen subjects. In 
each session, all subjects were partitioned into the three treatment conditions so that each treatment consisted of 
four to six subjects within each session (except session 19, which only consisted of treatments one and two). 14 
 
reported mean payoff in the second throw (Table 2, model 2). Both regressions only refer to 
data from information treatment two, where information about distributions varied.  
The more specific ignorance hypothesis has to be rejected. The analysis in Table 2 reveals 
that  session  variability  in  information  feedback  regarding  initial  lying  does  not  have 
statistically significant effects on subsequent lying. We conducted a number of additional 
robustness checks of the null finding (see the appendix for more details). Our robustness 
checks consisted of different operationalizations of revealed lying behavior, such as using the 
session skewness instead of session means. We also tried different statistical specifications of 
the  hypotheses  by  taking  different  models,  such  as  Poisson  regressions.  Furthermore,  we 
ensured by simulation scenarios that the variability in sessions would have been sufficient to 
elicit significant findings and to make sure that our models are not affected by statistical 
artifacts like the so-called “regression to the mean”. All these analyses indicate that the more 
specific ignorance hypothesis has to be rejected.  
 
Table 2: Regression models quantifying whether a higher indicator of lying about first throws 
in sessions (measured by session means) increases the number of reported five have (1) and 
reported payoffs (2) in second throws  
  (1)  (2) 
  five in 2
nd throw  reported payoff 2
nd throw 
  only info 2 treatment  only info 2 treatment 
session mean 1
st throw  -0.067  0.029 
  (-0.17)  (0.085) 
     
intercept  -0.012  3.58
** 
  (-0.0089)  (3.01) 
N  150  150 
Notes: Model (1) reports a logistic regression model for the propensity to report a five in the 2nd throw 
explained by the mean payoff in the 1st throw in each session. Model (2) reports a linear regression model 
for the reported payoff in the 2nd throw explained by the mean payoff in the 1st throw in each session. Both 
models refer only to data from information treatment two, which is the only treatment with information 
feedback regarding the distribution of payoffs in the experimental session. Both regressions take clustered 
standard errors for sessions into account, t statistics in parentheses, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. 
 
 
Another  interesting  exploration  is  to  estimate  the  extent  of  honesty  and  lying  from  the 
aggregate distributions of reported payoffs. It is possible to distinguish between two pure 15 
 
types of players; moralists and liars, based on the statistical computation of Fischbacher and 
Heusi (2008, p. 12 f.). Regardless of their actual entitlements, moralists report the truth and 
liars report the highest payoff.  
The proportion of moralists can be estimated with respect to the number of individuals who 
report a zero payoff. One can extrapolate this to the whole population because it is plausible 
that somebody who is willing to report zero payoffs would truthfully report any higher payoff. 
Therefore, the full proportion of moralists can be estimated by multiplying the frequency of 
reported zero payoffs by six. The proportion of liars can be estimated with respect to the 
number of reported five‟s – those who claim the highest payoff. The difference between the 
expected percentage of five‟s for a fair die (1/6) and the empirically reported proportion of 
five‟s (“empfive”) returns an estimate of liars in the population. In addition, this estimate has 
to be adjusted, because there are liars who actually threw a five, but would lie if they threw 
any lower number. Thus, the estimate of liars is corrected by the multiple 6/5. Therefore, the 
estimate of liars is (empfive - 1/6) * 6/5. Finally, there are actors who try to disguise their lies, 
who we call deceivers. These actors only partially increase their payoffs in order to disguise 
their lies. They report anything between two and four. We take a simple estimate of the 
frequency of this type by assuming that they represent the remaining population (100 % - 
moralists - liars = deceivers).  
Figure 6 reports the estimated proportion of moralists, deceivers and liars in the second throw 
separately for each experimental treatment. The largest fraction, about half the population, 
consists  of  deceivers.  There  are  fewer  moralists  (roughly  30  %).  Liars  are  least  frequent 
(roughly  20%).  The  figure  also  allows  comparing  the  different  distributions  of  lying, 
deceiving and honest behavior by treatments. There are about 10% - 20% less moralists and 
about 10% more deceivers and more liars in the experimental conditions with information 
feedback compared to the control condition without information feedback.
5  
                                                            
5 We mainly intend to report estimates of honesty, deception and lying by Figure 6. One statistical problem of 
estimating differences in types with regard to treatments is the low statistical power of estimates of moralists 
because they are only based on the relatively low number of reported zero payoffs. This also affects the estimates 
of deceivers, which are based on the remaining fraction after having accounted for moralists and liars. The 
estimates of liars are much more robust due to the much larger number of reported five‟s. This is why we do not 
discuss in detail significance tests with regard to differences in the proportion of moralists, deceivers and liars 
between the three treatments. Table A2 in the appendix reports respective bootstrap z-values and robustness 
checks with logistic regressions. The differences are not statistically significant; however, all effects have the 
expected direction. 16 
 
 
Figure 6: The proportion of different types in the second throw by experimental condition 
 
Finally, we explored the socio-demographic determinants of lying. We estimated an ordered 
logit model, which predicts the reported number in the first throw; hence the “individual” 
propensity of lying without confounding social effects regarding the information of lying 
behavior of others. Participants with a higher monthly budget lie less, seemingly because they 
are less needy. Older persons lie more (see the model OLOGIT in Table A1 in the appendix). 
Protestants and Catholics are not significantly different from undenominational participants in 
their propensity to lie.  
 
V. DISCUSSION 
Our  key  point  is  to  demonstrate  the  contagiousness  of  norm  violations  by  the  exclusive 
mechanism  of  conditional  norm  compliance.  This  mechanism  is  the  “purest”  kind  of 
contagiousness,  where  actors  simply  imitate  norm  violations  of  others.  Our  experimental 
design excluded any punishment threats by generating absolute anonymity of norm violations. 
This excluded any explanation based on rational belief updates or cost-benefit analyses of 
getting  caught  and  punished.  Our  findings  therefore  demonstrate  that  normative  behavior 17 
 
implies  “automatic”,  non-strategic  decision-making  when  it  comes  to  compliance  with  or 
violation of social norms. Our results suggest that merely information of norm violations of 
others is sufficient to trigger its spread.  
Our experiment investigated whether lifting the veil of ignorance of the extent of others‟ norm 
violations triggers subsequently higher rates of norm violations (ignorance hypothesis). This 
could  be  confirmed:  Giving  information  about  the  extent  of  lying  significantly  increased 
subsequent lying. This effect was not due to learning, habituation or history effects since the 
effect  did  not  occur  in  the  control  condition,  which  provided  no  information  feedback. 
Further, this effect was robust to the specific kind of information feedback; either knowledge 
about norm violations of the own group or of a group of similar others.   
The  session  analyses  suggest  that  pure  information  feedback  is  sufficient  to  provoke 
subsequent cheating. It is apparently not the case that a greater extent of revealed cheating 
triggers even more cheating. This could mean that information feedback gives subjects the 
idea that others are cheating and this awareness is sufficient to trigger the erosion of the 
honesty norm. The actual extent of cheating seems to be less relevant. Further, it could be that 
subjects have difficulties to calculate the extent of cheating from the distribution of reported 
payoffs  and  therefore  only  take  the  fact  into  account  that  cheating  does  occur.  A  third 
alternative is that the effects are too small to be detected with 466 cases. However, the sample 
size  is  already  quite  large.  While  the  sample  size  is  large,  our  design  yields  inefficient 
estimates  with  the  advantage  of  high  anonymity  and  the  disadvantage  of  statistical 
inefficiency.  Subsequent  studies  could  explore  other  designs  yielding  more  efficient 
estimates. 
In  our  study,  we  implicitly  assumed  that  the  rate  of  undetected  norm  violations  is 
underestimated. This implies that underestimation stabilizes the norm. The larger this bias, the 
stronger  the  effect  of  ignorance  on  norm  compliance.  In  contrast,  if  the  extent  of  norm 
violations  was  overestimated,  the  reverse  effect  could  occur;  a  preventive  effect  of 
knowledge. This could also be tested in prospective experiments.  
The erosion of social norms is typically a gradual, subtle and slow process. Social norms do 
not disappear overnight. It is even more astonishing that the effects are detectable in a short 
experiment.  Possibly,  the  honesty  norm  would  further  deteriorate  if  we  allowed  for  a 18 
 
substantial continuation of norm violations and respective information feedback; a conjecture 
which could be tested in follow-up studies.  
The conclusion that contagiousness of norm violations can exclusively operate by conditional 
norm compliance relates our findings not only to social psychology but also to experimental 
economics.  Here,  the  recent  notion of  conditional  cooperation describes  the experimental 
finding that people condition their contributions to public goods on their beliefs of what they 
think  others  would  contribute  (Fischbacher  et  al.  2001).  Individuals  with  cooperative 
intentions cease to cooperate if they become aware of sufficiently many freeriders (Gächter 
2007).  The  finding  of  conditional  cooperation  in  experimental  economics  overlaps  with 
sociological and social psychological evidence showing that individuals align their behavior 
with the behavior of others (Goldstein, Cialdini and Griskevicius 2008; Schultz et al. 2007). 
While the economic concept of conditional cooperation refers to strategic reasoning based on 
reciprocity, the sociological concept of conditional norm compliance is more general and also 
applies to non-strategic, automatic imitation behavior.  
Because our design excluded explanations based on strategic motives, our findings underline 
the  non-strategic  nature  of  normative  behavior.  In  our  experiment,  there  is  no  “rational” 
explanation of why actors condition their behavior on others, because liars in the group did 
not  affect  payoffs  of  other  members.  This  distinguishes  our  findings  from  conditional 
cooperation in public goods experiments, where free-riders in the group lower the payoffs of 
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Appendix A1: Regression models for ignorance hypothesis 
Table A1: Regression models on the preventive effects of ignorance  
  OLS 1  OLS 2  LOGIT  OLOGIT 
  (payoff 2 – payoff 1)  (payoff2 – payoff1)  (payoff = 5)  (payoff 1) 
  coef.  s.e.   coef.  s.e.  coef.  s.e.  coef.  s.e. 
  experiment                 
first throw          (ref.)       
control group (info 0)  (ref.)    -0.234  0.138  -0.054  0.167     
experimental group (info1)  0.487*  0.195  0.253  0.135  0.243  0.206     
experimental group (info2)  0.501*  0.189  0.267  0.177  0.360*  0.182     
  religion                 
undenominational              (ref.)   
protestant              0.274  0.236 
catholic              0.027  0.314 
other              0.975*  0.372 
religiousness              -0.057  0.075 
  individual                 
gender (male = 1)              0.148  0.176 
age (in years)              0.053*  0.025 
monthly budget (in 100 CHF)              -0.023*  0.011 
years education father              0.015  0.044 22 
 
years education mother              -0.053  0.037 
Intercept  -0.234  0.138      -0.601*  0.105     
threshold 1              -2.099*  0.947 
threshold 2              -1.039  0.920 
threshold 3              -0.458  0.929 
threshold 4              0.257  0.924 
threshold 5              1.239  0.934 
N1  466    466    932    431   
N2  30    30    30    30   
adj. R
2  0.01    0.01           
pseudo R
2          0.004    0.01   
χ
2          5.827    37.43   
Note: The table reports coefficients with clustered standard errors (* p < 0.05) for linear, logistic and ordered logistic regression models. Column 1 
reports a linear regression for the difference between the first and the second reported payoff. Here, the control condition is the reference category so 
that  the  coefficients  express  the  difference  between  the  respective  experimental  and  the  control  condition.  Column  2  reports  the  same  linear 
regression without an intercept. This means that the coefficients test whether the difference between the mean reported payoff difference between first 
and second throw is different from zero in the respective condition (control, info 1 and info 2). Column 3 reports a logistic regression model for the 
likelihood to report the maximum payoff of five. The model is specified such that the reference category is the first throw. This means that the 
coefficients express the difference between first and second throw for each experimental condition. A negative coefficient means that the likelihood 
to report a five was lower in the second throw than in the first throw. A positive coefficient expresses an increased likelihood to report a five in the 
second throw. Column 4 reports an ordered logit model for the first reported payoff. The experimental conditions are omitted so that the coefficients 




Appendix A2: Specific ignorance hypothesis about session variability in info 2 condition 
We  performed  a  number  of  additional  robustness  checks  of  the  finding  that  the  specific 
ignorance hypothesis has to be rejected (Table 2 in the main text). First, we confirmed that 
our data is rich enough to allow for the detection of session effects. Figure A1 illustrates the 
session variability of reported first payoffs and compares it with simulation models of a fair 
die with a comparable number of observations. This demonstrates that there is considerable 
variation in reported payoffs in different sessions. Figure A2 shows that there is considerable 
variation of session means and further illustrates that the session means are much higher than 
one would expect from a fair die.  
We also checked that the null findings are not due to too little variation in different numbers 
of  reported  five‟s  in  each  session  (see  Figure  A3).  We  further  tried  different 
operationalizations of our hypothesis. We analyzed the data on session level by performing a 
Poisson regression of the number of reported five‟s in the 1st throw in each session predicting 
the number of reported five‟s in the 2nd throw; yielding no significant effects. Other variants 
returned similar results as using the skewness of the distribution of reported first payoffs 
instead of the mean payoffs or the number of reported five‟s. We further complemented the 
empirical regression analyses with respective simulation models of a fair die with a large 
number of observations to make sure that our models are not affected by statistical artifacts 
like the so-called “regression to the mean”. Finally, we compared the regression models with 
similar  models  for  the  data  of  the  other  two  information  treatments.  All  these  additional 
analyses indicate that the specific ignorance hypothesis has to be rejected, i.e. that session 
variability of initial lying has no significant effects on subsequent lying.
6  
 
                                                            
6 The mentioned additional robustness analyses are available on request. 24 
 
 
Figure A1: Distribution of payoffs in 1st throw by session, (A) sorted by mean session payoff. 
(B) Simulated distribution of payoffs in 1st throw sorted by mean session payoff (30 groups 




Figure A2: Distribution of arithmetic mean‟s for each session in (left) experimental data and 





Figure  A3:  Distribution  of  number  of  five‟s  in  1st  throw  for  each  session  in  (left) 
experimental data and (right) simulated data (30 groups of 16 subjects, 480 observations) 
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Appendix A3: Analysis of distributions of honesty types in different treatments  
 
Table A2: Bootstrap z-values for the differences of the extent of moralists, deceivers and liars 
between each experimental treatment and the control group in the second throw.  
  moralists  deceivers  Liars 
  coefficient  coefficient  Coefficient 
  (bootstrap z-value)  (bootstrap z-value)  (bootstrap z-value) 
       
Difference info 2 - info 0  - 0.18  0.096  0.082 
  (-1.13)  (0.63)  (1.73) 
       
Difference info 1 - info 0  - 0.076  0.018  0.058 
  (-0.46)  (0.11)  (1.27) 
Notes: The bootstrapped differences are computed with 1000 replications. The estimated boostrapped 
differences for moralists and liars are essentially similar to respective logistic regression models which take 
the treatments as independent and the extent of reported five‟s or zero‟s in the second throw as dependent 
variables. Because the extent of deceivers is computed as rest category (100 % - moralists – liars), it is not 
possible to conduct a respective regression model as a robustness check for deceivers. 
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Appendix A4: Screenshots of experimental treatments 
 
 
Figure A4: Instructions of the experiment (top) and the report of the 1st throw (bottom) 28 
 
 
Figure A5: Screenshot of the 2nd experimental treatment (info 1) and the shown distribution 
of the experiment from Fischbacher und Heusi (2008) 
 
 
Figure A6: Screenshot of the 3rd experimental treatment (info 2) based on the distribution in 
session 17 